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 Reva Siegel’s fine lecture is both illuminating and provocative.1  
 Illuminating: She convincingly establishes a striking parallelism be-
tween the doctrinal positions elaborated by the Supreme Court and those 
developed by the proponents of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) in 
their struggle for ratification. As she explains, the women’s movement did 
not really lose the ERA—the big loser was Article V, which failed to regis-
ter the movement’s triumph, and the big winner was the Supreme Court, 
which reinterpreted the Equal Protection Clause in a way that created a “de 
facto” ERA. 
 Provocative: She suggests that her case study poses a big problem for 
theories—like mine and Nino Scalia’s (and countless others)—that defend 
a fundamental distinction between higher lawmaking and constitutional 
interpretation. We old fogies think that higher lawmaking is a matter for 
the People, interpretation is a matter for the Court. She urges us to dissolve 
the distinction between lawmaking and adjudication by confronting 
cases—like the one she describes—in which the Court seems to be re-
sponding directly to bottom-up movements by reinterpreting the  
Constitution. The women’s movement, speaking for the People, did not 
make new higher law through Article V (Scalia). Nor did it make new law 
by gaining control of the political branches, and transforming the Court’s 
personnel, in the manner of New Deal liberalism (me). It made new law by 
convincing the Court to change its interpretations of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in precisely the manner contemplated by the ERA. So good-
bye to the grand old distinction between lawmaking and interpretation, 
hello to postmodern fluidity. 
 As Siegel recognizes, her essay suffices only to raise her provocative 
challenge, not to resolve it. To assess her thesis, we must move beyond a 
single case study to consider the Court’s relationship to other social 
movements and see whether Siegel’s claims are vindicated more gener-
ally—and if not, why not. It would be nice if other scholars explored other 
contexts with Siegel’s jurisprudential sophistication. But a cursory glance 
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at some other key doctrinal innovations of the Civil Rights Era suggests 
that Siegel has been dealing with a very special case; in general, a mobi-
lized movement was neither necessary nor sufficient for dramatic doctrinal 
change by the Warren and Burger Courts. (Section I.) 
 These Courts were not all-purpose spokesmen for constitutional poli-
tics by social movements. If we stand back from Siegel’s particular study, 
the larger pattern suggests the relative autonomy of the legal culture in 
general, and the Supreme Court in particular. But if this is true in other ar-
eas, is Siegel’s case so very different?  
 Before we join in deconstructing the distinction between lawmaking 
and adjudication, consider an alternative hypothesis: We cannot assess the 
contribution of the women’s movement without coming to terms with the 
Court’s ongoing effort to make sense of the Equal Protection Clause. Only 
then can we understand why the women’s movement succeeded in moving 
the Court in its direction when so many other movements failed. (Section 
II.) 
 What is more, the processes through which the movement convinced 
the Court were distinct from, though related to, those that Siegel empha-
sizes. She stresses the political dynamics of the ratification debate in the 
states, but other forms of advocacy were more significant to the Court. I do 
not deny that the movement played an important role in catalyzing the 
dramatic transformation of legal doctrine in the 1970s. Just as it is a mis-
take to dissolve law into politics, it is also wrong to pretend law has com-
plete autonomy from the political and cultural forces swirling around it. 
My relative autonomy thesis suggests that the dominant legal culture’s 
framing of the relevant issues should be at the center of analysis. The legal 
culture framed the issues; the women’s movement was efficacious only 
when it interacted with these legal frames in ways that helped propel doc-
trine in its direction. (Section III.) 
I 
The Dog That Didn’t Bark 
 The Warren-Burger era is full of big doctrinal changes, providing ma-
terials for a rich comparative perspective on Siegel’s thesis. A brief survey 
suggests that the rise of a social movement was neither a necessary nor suf-
ficient condition for generating a doctrinal revolution.  
 First, there are many cases in which the Supreme Court dramatically 
changed doctrine even though there was no big social movement pushing 
it. To begin with the obvious, nobody was marching in the streets for the 
rights of criminal defendants. That doctrinal change had a lot more to do 
with the Court’s increasing acceptance of Hugo Black’s views of the  
Fourteenth Amendment’s relationship to the Bill of Rights. It is true, of 
course, that the Court’s elaboration of a “selective incorporation” doctrine 
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did generate a large popular backlash successfully exploited by Richard 
Nixon and conservatives ever since.2 But this is not the kind of movement 
activity that Siegel is talking about. Her picture is of a Court responding to 
a movement, not merely provoking a countermovement. The interpretive 
dynamics of the legal culture, not a shift in the movement culture, accounts 
for the Warren Court’s revolution in criminal procedure.  
 The same is true of Brown v. Board of Education. The early Warren 
Court was not responding to black sit-ins—or other movement activity in 
the South—for the simple reason that such activity was insignificant during 
the late 1940s and early 1950s. If you believe Michael Klarman (and I do), 
Southern politics was then characterized by slow evolution in the progres-
sive direction, not mobilized movement activity by blacks or whites.3 Once 
again, it was the Supreme Court’s opinion in Brown that provoked a reac-
tion resulting in mass mobilization by blacks and whites, with the outcome 
teetering in the balance for quite some time before it was finally resolved 
in the 1960s.4  
 Similarly, the Supreme Court was not responding to movement activ-
ity when it revolutionized American politics with its reapportionment deci-
sion. On this occasion, the Court’s interventions proved broadly popular, 
and did not generate much of a backlash. But Frankfurter was no fool, and 
his anxieties about a damaging political reaction could not be casually dis-
missed ex ante.5 Once again, the reapportionment decisions were largely a 
product of interpretive theories coming out of the Carolene Products  
                                                                                                                          
 2. For a principled defense of “selective incorporation,” see Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of 
Rights: Creation and Reconstruction 215-30 (1998). For Richard Nixon’s response to the 
criminal procedure revolution, see Richard M. Nixon, Toward Freedom From Fear (May 8, 1968), in 
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developments in race relations after World War II). 
 4. Id. at 385-442 (describing civil rights politics after Brown, through 1965). I have argued 
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courtroom and establish a mobilized presence in the larger society.  
 5. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (“Courts ought not to enter this political 
thicket.”). 
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tradition, not anything resembling a popular movement. The prospect of 
reaction served as a deterrent to judicial innovation, not as a prod. 
 Criminal procedure, racial justice, and reapportionment: It is perfectly 
obvious that social movements are not necessary preconditions for large-
scale doctrinal change. But perhaps they serve as sufficient conditions? 
 The answer is No, and it is easy to provide counterexamples. During 
the late 1960s and early 1970s, demonstrations against the Vietnam War 
were far more salient than the Women’s Strike so vividly described by 
Siegel in her essay. And like the women’s movement, the peace movement 
took to the courts as well as the streets.  
 But the Court was not interested. Over the bitter complaints of  
Justices Douglas and Stewart, it simply refused to hear cases challenging 
the legality of the war.6 The Warren Court may have overruled Frank-
furter’s political question doctrine when it came to reapportionment, but it 
deferred to the political branches on the great question of war and peace. 
The anti-war movement scored peripheral legal victories only in doctrinal 
areas, like the First Amendment, where its claims fit within the ecology of 
existing doctrine—and even there, it suffered big defeats.7  
 For another counterexample, consider the most dynamic social 
movement of the early 1950s. I am speaking, alas, of the anti-Communist 
crusade led by Senator McCarthy—a mobilized mass movement if there 
ever was one. While the early Warren Court did make concessions to 
McCarthyism at the height of its political success, it launched a doctrinal 
counteroffensive as soon as it was prudent to do so, culminating in ringing 
declarations of First Amendment principle in the 1960s.8 Rather than rati-
fying the leading principles of McCarthyism, the Court repudiated them.9 
So the conclusion seems irresistible: The mobilization of a powerful 
movement for constitutional change is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
large doctrinal changes by the Supreme Court. Big shifts occur without 
social movements, and when movements arise the Court sometimes ignores 
                                                                                                                          
 6. See Edward Keynes, Undeclared War: Twilight Zone of Constitutional Power 84 
(2d ed. 1991). 
 7. Compare United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (draft card burning unprotected by 
First Amendment), with Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (student 
protest protected).  
 8. Lucas A. Powe, Jr., The Warren Court and American Politics 14-17 (2000) 
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values during the late 1950s); id. at 310-17 (describing the more aggressive dismantling of the anti-
Communist security program after Frankfurter’s retirement).  
 9. See, e.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 265-66 (1967) (invalidating a statute 
imposing a blanket prohibition on Communist Party members from employment in defense facilities); 
Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967) (invalidating a New York statute requiring 
loyalty oaths from university professors); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965) 
(striking down a requirement that recipients of “communist political propaganda” explicitly request 
delivery in order to obtain the mail). 
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their demands, sometimes reacts against them, and sometimes, as in 
Siegel’s case, favors them. 
II 
Surviving McGovern 
 To reflect further on the exceptional character of Siegel’s case, let me 
elaborate a bit upon her notion of constitutional culture. It will help to dis-
tinguish four interacting components: professional culture, political culture, 
civic culture, and popular culture. Professional culture specifies the range 
of argumentative moves considered legitimate where law is spoken by 
knowledgeable lawyers and judges.10 The shape of this conversational rep-
ertoire changes over time—during one decade it may seem obvious that 
most of the Bill of Rights is not incorporated by the Fourteenth  
Amendment; during another it may seem obvious that it is; and during an-
other the whole question seems up for grabs. But at any particular time, 
knowledgeable lawyers know which position is ascendant, which is plausi-
ble but problematic, and which is beyond the pale.11 Indeed, if they failed 
to comprehend these distinctions, they would be committing malpractice 
and excommunicating themselves from the professional culture.  
 Professional discourse is only relatively autonomous from the broader 
cultural force-field. It is heavily influenced, over time, by other discursive 
subsystems. For starters, there is the established political culture, by which 
I mean something narrow: the pattern of constitutional argument accepted 
as legitimate within established institutions—most notably the presidency 
and Congress—populated by successful politicians and the political parties 
which get them into office. Sometimes these patterns are relatively close to 
those prevailing in the professional culture, but sometimes they diverge 
very substantially.  
 And then there is civic culture, consisting of civil society organiza-
tions—churches and unions, the National Rifle Association and the 
NAACP—which formulate and agitate on a broad range of constitutional 
questions. Finally, there is the popular culture—fed by civic education in 
the schools and supported by constant chatter in the media and ordinary 
life. It is a tremendously important fact that constitutional culture has deep 
popular roots in America. Among other things, the prevailing patterns of 
popular culture sometimes allow civil society organizations to mobilize 
millions of ordinary Americans to support social movements that express 
their programs for change within the language of constitutional law.  
 But it is quite another thing to expect these social movements—even 
very powerful ones—to have a direct and short-term impact on the course 
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6  CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:TBD 
of judicial decisions. By any metric, the anti-Communist movement in the 
1950s and the anti-war movement of the 1960s were far more powerful 
than the feminist movement of the 1970s. And yet the Court rejected the 
first in response to deep commitments within the professional culture sup-
porting the First Amendment, and ignored the second through the political 
question doctrine. Similarly, we cannot understand the Court’s shift in fa-
vor of women without exploring the dynamics of the professional culture 
which shaped the evolving understanding of the Justices. It was the Court’s 
understanding of the evolving requirements of Equal Protection which 
shaped its response to the women’s movement, not the other way around.  
 I do not claim social movements never have an impact on judicial de-
cisions. But speaking broadly, the principal pathway is through the political 
culture. As they gain more and more adherents, movements begin to have 
an increasing impact on the way presidents and Congressmen in Washing-
ton D.C. talk about the Constitution—politicians are after votes, and if 
movements will bring voters to the polls, it is silly to ignore what they are 
saying. In contrast, judges have life tenure and can view movement rheto-
ric from a much more critical stance, using cultural tools honed by genera-
tions of professionals to assess the legal significance of movement rhetoric.  
 Nevertheless, history teaches that it is possible for very successful 
movements to transform the professional culture by deploying something I 
have called the movement-party strategy. Under this scenario, a move-
ment—or a coalition of movements—successfully becomes a power within 
a political party, and if the party wins repeated presidential and Congres-
sional elections, movement partisans may ultimately gain control over Su-
preme Court nominations and appointments, generating massive 
jurisprudential shifts in their direction. 
 This strategy has deep roots in American history, starting with  
Jefferson’s movement-Republicans, Jackson’s movement-Democrats, and 
Lincoln’s movement-Republicans. Its greatest twentieth century success 
was achieved by the New Deal liberal coalition under Presidents Roosevelt 
and Truman.12 We are currently seeing yet another replay of the move-
ment-party scenario at the dawn of the twenty-first century, with the  
Republican Party playing the role of transformative agent.  
 More relevant for present purposes, the movement-party strategy also 
played itself out during Professor Siegel’s period. In 1968, movement ac-
tivists outside the Democratic Party Convention in Chicago helped destroy 
the electoral prospects of Hubert Humphrey, a model New Deal liberal. In 
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response, the Party opened its doors to the new movements at its next 
presidential convention.13 The result was a replay of the Populist takeover 
of the Democratic Convention of 1896. Once again, the new movements 
marked their ascendancy in the party by nominating a hero from the 
American heartland—George McGovern was the twentieth century’s an-
swer to William Jennings Bryan. But, as in 1896, the movement victory at 
the Convention only led to a shattering defeat in the fall, ending the prom-
ise of broad based constitutional transformation for the indefinite future.  
 If the McGovern election had turned out differently, Siegel would 
have been in a position to tell us a story of overwhelming movement influ-
ence on the professional culture and the Supreme Court. In some far-off 
galaxy, there may be a planet where George McGovern did win a smashing 
victory in 1972, leading to all sorts of changes over the next generation. In 
this distant constellation, law students might well be studying the opinions 
of the great conservative Chief Justice Laurence Tribe in his ongoing 
struggle with a liberal faction led by Justice Catherine MacKinnon over the 
future of constitutional interpretation. 
 But it did not turn out that way on planet Earth. Professor Siegel does 
not pause to reflect upon the dark shadow that McGovern’s massive defeat 
casts upon her story. If the Supreme Court was responding to the rise and 
fall of social movements, why did the Democrat’s movement-party fiasco 
of 1972 not lead the Court to call a total halt to the further aggressive de-
velopment of egalitarian principles? 
 The question becomes more pointed when we consider that the Burger 
Court did contain the dynamic tendencies of Warren Court jurisprudence 
when it came to race relations. The accidents of history opened up four 
vacancies during the Nixon Administration, and by 1974, the new majority 
was severely restricting “forced busing” in Milliken v. Bradley, and then 
went on to repudiate a broad interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause 
in Washington v. Davis.14 If the Court was calling a halt in the case of 
blacks, why was it moving forward in the case of women? 
 Not because the women’s movement was more powerful than the 
movement for black civil rights during the 1970s—while the latter had lost 
some of its moral momentum since the glory days of the March on  
Washington, it was still alive and kicking. It is hard, then, to accept 
Siegel’s hypothesis of a direct link between the activities of the women’s 
movement and the direction of Supreme Court decisions. You cannot ex-
plain a variable by invoking a constant: If the Court is cutting back on 
equal protection for blacks while expanding it for women, but there is not a 
big difference in the organizational and moral force of the two movements, 
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 14. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
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we should be searching for something else going on in the culture that 
helps account for the striking difference. 
III 
How the Movement Mattered  
 We begin to hit pay-dirt when we turn to the dynamics of the estab-
lished political culture. While Richard Nixon made opposition to “forced 
busing” a central aspect of his election campaign in 1968,15 the Republican 
Party traditionally supported the ERA, and candidate Nixon affirmed his 
support for the amendment in July 1968.16 As curious as it might seem to-
day, it was the Democrats, not the Republicans, who were the long-time 
opponents of the measure. Eleanor Roosevelt and other leading New Deal 
feminists flatly opposed the amendment, fearing it would render unconsti-
tutional special protective legislation for women workers; the AFL-CIO 
had given this rejectionist position strong support for many decades.17 
Throughout the Kennedy-Johnson years, bureaucratic resistance to the 
ERA was led by an earlier generation of feminists in the Women’s Bureau 
and elsewhere, and while the Humphrey campaign endorsed a more sweep-
ing feminist agenda than the Republicans, the ERA was conspicuously ab-
sent from its call for action.18  
 Nixon’s election paradoxically provided the rising women’s move-
ment with an opening. Its traditional feminist opponents had been swept 
out power and it moved aggressively to fill the vacuum. During its first 
three years in power, the Nixon Administration did not repeat the presi-
dent’s earlier endorsement of the ERA, but it did not run away from it  
                                                                                                                          
 15. Nixon supported the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and other Great Society legislation—saying 
that they represented a “needed revolution” in civil rights—but he publicly opposed busing in his 1968 
campaign. See, e.g., Nixon-Agnew Campaign Committee, Nixon on the Issues 98 (1968) 
[hereinafter Nixon on the Issues] (“No child, black or white, should be deprived of an adequate 
education. I would enforce Title VI of the Civil Rights act of 1964. I oppose any action by the Office of 
Education that goes beyond a mandate of Congress; a case in point is the busing of students to achieve 
racial balance in schools.”).  
 16. See Statement by Former Vice President Richard M. Nixon on the Equal Rights for Women 
Amendment (July 1968), microformed on Civil Rights During the Nixon Administration, Reel 23 
(University Publications of America); Hugh Davis Graham, Civil Rights and the 
Presidency: Race and Gender in American Politics 1960-1972 189, 203 (1992) [hereinafter 
Graham, Civil Rights].  
 17. Roosevelt only dropped her opposition to the ERA in the 1950s because similar language 
appeared in the United Nations charter, and she did not want to oppose the U.N. See Jane J. 
Mansbridge, Why We Lost the ERA 9 (1986). 
 18. See Hugh Davis Graham, The Civil Rights Era: Origins and Development of 
National Policy 1960-1972 394-95 (1990) (noting that the Democratic establishment and the 
Women’s Bureau attempted to “hold [their] traditional line in defense of protective legislation,” and 
against the ERA, and succeeded in “avoiding the divisiveness of the ERA” in task forces on women’s 
issues). 
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either, and it supported a series of other equal rights initiatives.19 Siegel is 
right to remind us that Assistant Attorney General Rehnquist surprised sup-
porters of the ERA at a House Judiciary subcommittee on April 1, 1971, 
when he criticized the amendment as unnecessary and dangerously open-
ended. But the fact remains that the Justice Department was officially sup-
portive,20 and Nixon himself came out in favor of the ERA before the  
Senate cast its decisive vote. The president’s endorsement clarified any 
doubts raised by Rehnquist’s earlier statement: the Republicans were on 
board, and the ERA was a broadly bipartisan initiative.21  
 It is here, if anywhere, that the women’s movement made its signal 
contribution to the on-going evolution of judicial doctrine. When the  
Justices of the Supreme Court looked out across Capitol Hill and down 
Pennsylvania Avenue, they saw a very different cultural dynamic on dis-
play in matters of race and gender: While there was an ongoing partisan 
battle on the scope of black civil rights, the President and Congress were 
joining together in bipartisan support of the constitutional rights of women.  
 But the reassuring signals from the established political culture were 
hardly sufficient to provoke an immediate doctrinal response from the  
Supreme Court. To the contrary, it was perfectly possible for the Justices to 
hold off a doctrinal revolution until they could learn the fate of the new 
constitutional initiative. After all, the Equal Protection Clause was enacted 
long ago by a distant People; the ERA, if ratified, would express the egali-
tarian commitments of contemporary Americans confronting the situation 
of women today. So why not wait and see?  
 This was precisely the point Justice Powell made in his concurring 
opinion in the breakthrough case of Frontiero v. Richardson; and it was 
precisely the point that Justice Brennan tried very hard to rebut in his opin-
ion for the plurality.22 If anything, Siegel’s remarkable study supports  
Justice Powell’s side of the argument. She shows that the decade-long de-
bate between the ERA’s supporters and critics was genuinely productive. 
In their efforts to convince the general public, activists on both sides 
moved to the center, adopting key elements of their opponent’s position as 
the debate proceeded over time. For all their passion, the Phyllis Schlaflys 
and the Pauli Murrays of the world engaged in real dialogue, not merely 
rival monologues. What is more, the Court’s fast-forward on Equal Protec-
                                                                                                                          
 19. See, e.g., Graham, Civil Rights, supra note 16, at 200, 205; Joan Hoff, Nixon 
Reconsidered 110-11 (1994) (detailing other “women’s questions” on which “Nixon proved much 
more liberal than expected.”).  
 20. See Serena Mayeri, Constitutional Choices: Legal Feminism and the Historical Dynamics of 
Change, 92 Calif. L. Rev. 755, 814 (2004). 
 21. See Graham, Civil Rights, supra note 16, at 203; Hoff, supra note 19, at 108.  
 22. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). Compare id. at 687-88 (Brennan, J.) 
(arguing that Congressional endorsement of amendment supports judicial development of equal 
protection doctrine), with id. at 692 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing for a wait-and-see 
approach). 
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tion served to undercut the ERA, since it gave substance to opponents’ 
claims that a formal amendment was not necessary to assure the core con-
stitutional rights claimed by the women’s movement.23 It is too much to 
say that the Court killed the ERA by providing the de facto ERA through 
judicial opinions. The fact is, Article V’s requirement of ratification by 
three-fourths of the states has condemned all controversial measures for the 
last seventy-five years, even when they gained the sustained support of a 
majority of Americans.24 But surely the Court’s fast-forward on Equal  
Protection did not help. 
 Nevertheless, it happened. Whatever the reason for the Court’s great 
leap forward, I very much doubt that it had much to do with the great rati-
fication debate then raging in the states. Sitting in its Marble Palace in 
Washington, the Court would have had to make a special effort to follow 
the debate raging in Montana or Illinois, and common sense suggests it was 
occupied with other matters. After all, the Justices were spending long days 
passing on certiorari petitions, thinking about cases, and writing opinions. 
After an exhausting day at the office, they could be forgiven if they tuned 
out news of the latest twists and turns of the ERA debate and chose to go to 
the opera instead. Anything is possible, but Siegel presents no archival evi-
dence suggesting that the Justices were attending to the ERA debate in a 
disciplined and nuanced way.25
 In contrast, the Justices were intently following the course of profes-
sional give-and-take in their courtroom—and they were very much aware 
of the dynamic development of Equal Protection doctrine over the last gen-
eration. Seasoned professionals are not only interested in the black-letter 
law of the moment, but the arc of its development. And by the early 1970s, 
Equal Protection doctrine had taken on a life of its own. Which brings me 
back to my old-fashioned thesis: It is this internal dynamic of the profes-
sional culture, not other aspects of the constitutional culture, which served 
                                                                                                                          
 23. See Mansbridge, supra note 17, at 45-47. 
 24. For an insightful account of the difficulties, see id. at 29-35.  
 25. Perhaps something will turn up in the archives, but nothing has so far. As Siegel points out, 
the appellees in Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) did make use of the ERA’s legislative history 
to support their claim that strict scrutiny “would [not] require the invalidation of laws based on a 
unique physical characteristic where the proper degree of relationship between the classification and the 
purpose of the legislation was established.” See Brief for Appellees at 44-45, Geduldig (citing the 
Congressional Record and Professor Thomas Emerson’s legislative history of the ERA from the Yale 
Law Journal). But the Court did not follow up. It did not give the legislative history any explicit weight 
in upholding discrimination based on pregnancy. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496-97 & n.20. 
 Serena Mayeri found a memo by Justice Brennan in the archives regarding the Frontiero case, 
emphasizing that the Court could “[n]ot count on the Equal Rights Amendment to make the equal 
protection issue go away.” He further predicts that the ratification campaign will ultimately fail. 
Mayeri, supra note 20, at 818. This shows that the Justices were attentive to the amendment’s 
prospects, but not that they were attentive to the particular arguments made by the protagonists in the 
ongoing debate. For further discussion of Frontiero, see supra note 22 and accompanying text.  
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as the prime mover in the Court’s decision to move forward on women’s 
rights in the 1970s. 
 My basic point involves the great transformation of Brown v. Board of 
Education from a deeply contestable decision in the 1950s to a fixed point 
of the professional culture by the early 1970s. I hope to analyze this com-
plex story in my next volume of We the People. But for now, a single vi-
gnette might serve to suggest the fragility of Brown as late as 1959. That 
was the year Herbert Wechsler generated shock waves in the legal commu-
nity with his critique of Brown in his Holmes Lectures at the Harvard Law 
School.26
 Every member of the profession was, of course, entirely familiar with 
the bitter opposition to Brown in the popular and political cultures. All you 
had to do was pick up the newspaper, or turn on the TV, to hear the latest 
reports about the goings-on in Little Rock and other sites of Southern white 
resistance. In contrast to the extravagant constitutional claims made in the 
Southern Manifesto issued by the region’s Congressional delegation,27 
Wechsler’s critique was mild and even tentative. Yet his lawyerly ques-
tions were so shocking precisely by virtue of his position within the profes-
sional culture. Here was a leading liberal law professor, the Director of the 
American Law Institute, taking the podium at the nation’s leading law 
school to challenge the legitimacy of the Court’s great departure in its 
Equal Protection jurisprudence. The Lectures immediately generated a 
wave of professional anxiety, and repeated efforts at refutation.28 But it 
was a compelling indication that, even in 1959, a year after Cooper v. 
Aaron,29 there was no professional consensus on the rightness of Brown.  
 By the end of the sixties, the profession had moved beyond 
Wechsler’s doubts and Brown became a fixed point in the legal culture. 
Despite his “law and order” campaign in 1968, Richard Nixon reaffirmed 
his commitment to Brown and strongly distinguished himself from George 
Wallace’s calls for continuing resistance.30 Nixon’s four appointments to 
                                                                                                                          
 26. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, Oliver Wendell Holmes 
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the Court shared this commitment. To be sure, they gave a relatively con-
servative interpretation to the reorientation of equal protection jurispru-
dence initiated by Brown. But all were thoroughly committed to its 
essential rightness. 
 This commitment, in turn, generated a new and compelling ques-
tion: If Equal Protection bans invidious state discrimination against blacks 
does it not have the same implication when other groups are burdened by 
invidious stereotypes?  
 Given Brown’s newly acquired status as a paradigmatic expression of 
our constitutional culture,31 it is hardly surprising that the Justices were 
prepared to take this interpretive question seriously. Indeed, it would have 
been surprising if they had not done so. We are dealing with something 
very basic to the Western legal mind: Once a legal principle is declared to 
be applicable to one class of cases, lawyers and judges will not rest until 
they understand why it does or does not apply to others that seem similar. 
The legal culture is perennially in search of reflective equilibrium—an elu-
sive goal, since the dominant principles of a legal system are always rising 
and falling, sometimes suddenly, requiring never-ending efforts at judicial 
recalibration.  
 However Sisyphean the task, this ongoing quest for reflective equilib-
rium is central to the life of the law. Like cases should be treated alike; and 
it is the job of judges to elaborate the relevant criteria of similarity and dif-
ference. In principle, every losing litigant is entitled to know why his case 
is different from those in which people like him are on the winning side. 
This elementary commitment to the rule of law sufficed to raise the critical 
question, as the Justices understood it: If the Equal Protection Clause now 
granted blacks powerful constitutional protections, why did these protec-
tions not also extend to women?32
 You did not have to be a rocket scientist to raise this question in 
1970—ordinary lawyers would have raised it on their own and ordinary 
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judges would have appreciated the need to answer it consistently with their 
hard-won commitment to Brown. What the women’s movement contrib-
uted on the legal front was a test case strategy and a stream of briefs and 
law review articles that impressed upon the courts the high seriousness of 
their obligations to elaborate a principled approach to Equal Protection.33 
Creating an appropriate legal climate was important in encouraging the 
Justices to take the question of principle seriously—after all, they were 
perfectly free to deny certiorari on women’s cases and direct their attention 
to other matters.  
 Once the Court began to take cases, a different dimension of the 
women’s movement came into play: Its success in challenging the very 
notion that women were fated by biological destiny to act the role of wife 
and mother. Books like Betty Friedan’s Feminine Mystique were not ef-
forts to win lawsuits.34 Their audience was the popular culture, not the le-
gal culture, and they were remarkably successful in catalyzing a broad 
challenge to the “separate spheres” ideology that shaped the horizons of 
millions of women in their everyday lives. All this critical activity did not 
generate a total revolution in entrenched social expectations defining 
women’s rightful role. This never happens.35 But it did dislodge entrenched 
expectations sufficiently to deprive traditionalist notions of a priceless ad-
vantage—their claims to self-evidence.  
 Traditionalists continued to assert that a woman’s biological destiny 
had consigned her to the domestic sphere and any other aspiration repre-
sented a betrayal of her true mission in life. But they could no longer sup-
pose that they were merely restating “common sense” of a kind that only 
Bohemian bra-burners would dispute. Given changing mores, traditional-
ists were obliged to defend their views on relatively equal terms with mil-
lions of modernist women who rejected their appeals to women’s “nature,” 
reframing such views as oppressive social conventions.  
 This transformation of social meaning was the movement’s most fun-
damental contribution to the dynamics of the professional culture during 
the 1970s.36 Once ongoing social contestation deprived traditional norms 
of their claim to common sense, they no longer could be presented in court 
as if they were self-evident truths about women’s nature. The norms began 
to look more like stereotypes similar to those traditionally used by racists 
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to justify subordination of blacks. As a consequence, the Justices could no 
longer draw a principled line between race and gender by reciting Justice 
Bradley’s famous lines in Myra Bradwell’s case.37
 The success of the women’s movement in the realm of popular cul-
ture, then, permitted its lawyers to reframe the legal meaning of their law-
suits. Gender discrimination no longer represented a common sense view 
of human nature. Instead, it could plausibly be presented as an issue in-
volving malleable social stereotypes. Once the popular culture permitted 
this reframing, the rule of law required the Justices to take women’s Equal 
Protection complaints seriously. It would have been entirely arbitrary to 
limit the antidiscrimination principle to racial stereotyping while exempt-
ing gender stereotyping. A principled Court had no choice but to work out 
the implications of the new principles in the new domain. 
 But such implications were worked out in a very old-fashioned way—
by hearing arguments on a case-by-case basis, using each lawsuit as a way 
to rethink and refine the meanings of basic principles, and elaborating an 
Equal Protection doctrine that took account of the distinctive features of 
gender discrimination. For present purposes, there is no need to appraise 
the Court’s success in this enterprise. My key point is jurisprudential: The 
Justices gave every indication of responding to the arguments they heard in 
court about the meaning of Equal Protection, not the arguments made in 
the broader political culture over the meaning of the ERA—there is no 
strong evidence that they even paid serious attention to these arguments, 
much less made them the basis of their decisions.  
 Indeed, other work by Professor Siegel only makes it clear how nar-
rowly the Justices conceived their legalistic problem. In a recent essay 
Siegel brilliantly rediscovered the broad ambitions of the “first wave” 
feminist movement that culminated in the Nineteenth Amendment—
inviting all of us to consider whether it would have been better if the  
Burger Court had used the Nineteenth Amendment, not the Fourteenth, as 
the textual basis for its reassertion of women’s rights in the modern era.38 
The Court of the 1970s did not ask this question. Instead of using the fer-
ment generated by “second wave” feminism to reflect on the meaning of 
the great constitutional achievement of the first women’s movement, the 
Court—prodded by advocates like Ruth Ginsburg—viewed the issue  
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entirely through the basic doctrinal structures crafted under the Equal  
Protection Clause, asking, for example, whether gender classifications mer-
ited strict scrutiny or mere rationality or something in between.39 In seek-
ing to adjudicate the claims of the women’s movement, the Court was not 
only making an effort to interpret the constitutional text, but it had an ex-
ceptionally narrow understanding of the relevant texts to interpret—merely 
using the Fourteenth Amendment framework developed for blacks, and 
failing to appreciate the broader relevance of the Nineteenth Amendment’s 
explicit concern with the status of women. If the Court’s legalistic focus 
was so narrow that it entirely missed the Nineteenth Amendment, it seems 
implausible to imagine the Justices looking for inspiration from the ERA 
debates proceeding in one or another state far from Washington D.C.  
 We should reject Professor’s Siegel’s provocative suggestion that her 
case study undermines the distinction between adjudication and lawmak-
ing. The Burger Court’s course is best understood as a very conventional 
exercise in constitutional interpretation, adapting the Equal Protection 
principles developed in the struggle for black civil rights to the new wave 
of women’s litigation.  
 This does not imply, as we have seen, that the women’s movement 
failed to play critical roles in framing the relevant legal issues. Three inter-
ventions seem particularly important. First, the movement took advantage 
of the Nixon Administration’s position on the ERA to generate bipartisan 
support for the amendment as it went through Congress, thereby marking 
off women’s issues from the polarized political debates on matters of racial 
justice. Second, movement lawyers encouraged the courts to take seriously 
their high obligation to interpret the Equal Protection Clause in a principled 
fashion that included women as well as blacks. Third, the movement’s lar-
ger success in challenging “separate spheres” ideology in the popular cul-
ture invited the Court to see a fundamental similarity between racial 
stereotyping and gender stereotyping.  
 These successful interventions in politics, law, and social life pro-
vided compelling support for the Court’s dramatic reinterpretation of the 
constitutional status of gender discrimination. But they do not suggest the 
Court was thinking of itself as the mouthpiece of the movement struggling 
for ratification of the ERA. Siegel’s study should not be taken as an invita-
tion to dissolve the distinction between adjudication and higher lawmaking. 
To the contrary, the Court was engaged in an entirely familiar effort at le-
gal interpretation, and a rather pedestrian one at that—limiting itself to the 
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obvious implications of the race analogy under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
without any effort to enrich its interpretation by finding that its predeces-
sors had trivialized the Nineteenth.  
 To be sure, the Court’s performance converged, as Siegel shows, with 
the positions developed by ERA advocates in the ratification debates.  
Nevertheless, it is easy to underestimate the loss suffered when the  
Supreme Court substituted its “de facto ERA” for the genuine article.  
Although a few legal cognoscenti will take a different view, ordinary peo-
ple will continue to think that the ERA was a loser, not a winner: One of 
the great modern movements for popular sovereignty will go down in 
popular history as a failure, undermining the sense that the American peo-
ple can—if they so choose—rewrite their Constitution to express their de-
mocratic commitments.  
 It should not have turned out that way. After all, a strong majority of 
the American people did support the ERA throughout the 1970s.40 Siegel’s 
talk of a traditionalist backlash should not disguise the fact that the ERA’s 
proponents won broad support from most Americans during the great rati-
fication debate. The real problem was not the women’s movement, but  
Article V and its grant of a veto to thirteen states reflecting a tiny minority 
of the nation’s citizens.41
 Over the longer haul, the defeat of the ERA may be a signal that  
Article V will no longer play a meaningful role in the country’s constitu-
tional development. Certainly that has been the conclusion of activists over 
the last quarter century. Since the defeat of the ERA, movement energy has 
moved from the left to the right. But the rising movements in the  
Republican Party have drawn the obvious conclusion from the ERA and 
have not invested their energies in campaigns for constitutional amend-
ments on the right to life, religion, or federalism. They have instead fol-
lowed the model of the New Deal and sought to use their influence with 
Republican presidents to appoint Supreme Court Justices to transform the 
Constitution through a series of revolutionary opinions. 
 The Republican decision to follow in the path of Franklin Roosevelt is 
currently generating a series of pathologies: “stealth” appointments, char-
acter assassination, and the like.42 More fundamentally, the politics of  
Senate confirmation simply does not invite the principled and broad-based 
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dialogue that Siegel so vividly describes. The contrast between the public 
relations circus of Senate hearings and the sustained ERA debate should 
prompt basic questions about our present higher lawmaking capacities: If 
Article V is unusable, and Senate hearings are inadequate, perhaps we 
should think more creatively about new forms of higher lawmaking for the 
twenty-first century? 
 I have tried to provoke a serious conversation on this issue—without 
much success, I must confess.43
 But they also serve who only stand and wait.44  
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